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Abstract 
This paper considers a setting in which the acquisition of human capital entails a change of 
location in social space that causes individuals to revise their comparison groups. Skill levels 
are viewed as occupational groups, and moving up the skill ladder by acquiring additional 
human capital, which in itself is rewarding, leads to a shift in the individual’s inclination to 
compare himself with a different, and on average better-paid, comparison group, which in 
itself is penalizing. The paper sheds new light on the dynamics of human capital formation, 
and suggests novel policy interventions to encourage human capital formation in the 
aggregate and, at the same time, reduce inter-group income inequality.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In his Fisher-Schultz Lecture at the Seventh World Congress of the Econometric Society, 
Akerlof (1997) introduced into the economics literature the concept of “social space.” Inter 
alia, Akerlof (1997, p.1010) states: “I shall let individuals occupy different locations in social 
space. Social interaction … will increase with proximity in this space. Current social location 
is acquired and dependent on the [individual’s] decision … .” In the current paper, we 
formalize the concept of “social space” by linking human capital choices with social location 
choices, that is, we bundle the decision to acquire more human capital with the “occupation” 
of a different location in “social space.” Consequently, a revision of the comparison to distinct 
reference groups ensues. Put differently, we posit that individuals are more likely to associate 
and interact with each other, and consequently to compare themselves with each other, when 
their levels of human capital are more alike. The essential idea of this paper is thus to view 
skill levels as occupational groups, and to consider the acquisition of a higher skill level 
(additional human capital) as being inherently associated with a shift in the individual’s 
inclination to compare himself with a different, and on average better-paid, comparison 
group: a technician who elects to acquire the additional skill requirements of an engineer also 
“acquires” a heightened comparison to engineers. And on average, engineers are better paid 
than technicians. One implication of this idea is that in addition to the standard correlates of 
human capital formation - the reaping of increasing rewards and the incurring of acquisition 
costs - affiliation with a higher-paid comparison group also impacts on the decision whether 
or not to acquire additional human capital. 
Treating skill levels as comparison groups sheds new light on the dynamics of human 
capital formation and points to novel policy interventions: when benchmarking against a new 
comparison group is in itself detrimental to wellbeing, because the higher incomes of others 
in the group cause increased dissatisfaction (relative deprivation), taxing those incomes will 
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render the comparison with the group less intimidating and, as a consequence, the acquisition 
of additional human capital will become more inviting. We devise a taxation scheme that will 
not dilute the incentive of “incumbents” to form human capital but will strengthen the 
incentive of would-be “newcomers” to acquire human capital.  
Our paper builds on three strands of literature: first, the literature that shows that the 
home environment in which children of otherwise equal abilities are raised “produces” adults 
of different levels of education; second, the literature which maintains that individuals 
persistently compare themselves to others in their reference group who are better off than 
themselves, that such comparisons lead to dissatisfaction, and that individuals act to reduce or 
eliminate this dissatisfaction; third, the literature that identifies strong positive links between 
income inequality and social dissatisfaction. We briefly address these three branches of 
literature.  
A large body of empirical work by Heckman and his collaborators (for a recent example 
see Cunha and Heckman, 2009) suggests that different family environments lead to different 
levels of investment in the education of children who are otherwise not different, and that in 
large measure, adversity in a child’s early years can be corrected or reversed by educational 
investments in adulthood (the efficiency of the timing of these investments in an individual’s 
life cycle notwithstanding). In Fan and Stark (2008), it was shown analytically that the 
children of better-educated individuals “who are exposed to a different value system, cultural 
values, and academic orientation” (Fan and Stark 2008, p.802) are more likely to be educated 
themselves than the children of poorly-educated individuals. In both studies, as well as in 
many other studies akin to them, however, there is no discussion of the natural possibility that 
when children become adults and observe the outcome of the educational decisions of their 
parents, they may choose to take up a course of study that revises the outcome of the parental 
decisions.  
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The theoretical and empirical literature on the role and significance of within-group 
comparisons for wellbeing and behavior has been growing fast (for a recent review, see Clark 
et al., 2008). The primary tenet of this literature argues that individuals derive (dis)utility, or 
relative deprivation, from comparing their earnings unfavorably with the earnings of others in 
their comparison group(s). The idea that relative income impinges on welfare dates back at 
least to Veblen (1924), and was formally analyzed in the pioneering and recent writings of, 
respectively, Yitzhaki (1979) and Walker and Smith (2002). For writings on relative 
deprivation and migration, see Stark (1993), and Stark and Wang (2005). In addition, Eibner 
and Evans (2005), and Luttmer (2005) are recent examples of empirical studies that 
demonstrate the importance of relative deprivation.  
Why would policy makers and social planners want to compress human capital levels? 
Why should a prevailing inequality be tampered with? Our presumption is that inequality in 
human capital translates into inequality in earnings. The negative relationship between 
income inequality and economic performance has been widely researched in the growth 
literature. For example, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) establish 
through political economy channels a negative theoretical link between inequality and growth. 
Their empirical work lends support to their theoretical predictions. On another front, 
mounting evidence suggests that a higher level of inequality in earnings translates into social 
ills and poor psycho-social health. A recent illuminating study by Wilkinson and Pickett 
(2009) assembles data on income inequality in 20 of the world’s richest nations, and in each 
of the 50 states of the U.S. Their empirical findings are revealing. For example, rates of 
mental illness are five times higher across the whole population in the most unequal than in 
the least unequal societies. One explanation that Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) suggest is that 
inequality increases stress right across society, not just among the least advantaged. Much 
research has been done on the stress hormone cortisol, which can be measured in saliva or 
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blood, and it emerges that chronic stress affects the neural system, and in turn the immune 
system. When stressed, people are more prone to depression and anxiety, and more likely to 
develop a host of bodily ills including heart disease, obesity, drug addiction, liability to 
infection, and rapid ageing. Societies where incomes are relatively equal have low levels of 
stress and high levels of trust, so that people feel secure and see others as cooperators. In 
unequal societies, by contrast, the rich suffer from fear of the poor, while those lower down 
the social order experience status anxiety, looking on those who are more successful with 
bitterness and on themselves with shame. The different social problems that stem from 
income inequality often form circuits or spirals. For example, babies born to mothers who are 
educational failures are at greater risk, as they grow up, of being educational failures 
themselves. A correlate of this inequality-related evidence is that reducing income inequality 
can improve the aggregate economic performance, health and wellbeing of the whole 
population.  
Let there be two types of individual: those, l, who come from families with a low level 
of education, and those, h, from families with a high level of education. In the current paper 
we focus attention on individuals of the first type. Ever since the publication of the findings of 
the Coleman et al. (1966) report that family characteristics, and not those of schools, explain 
variability in educational outcomes, it has been recognized that inequalities in family 
environment translate into unequal adult educational outcomes. These outcomes are neither 
dictated by genes nor cast in stone. There is mounting evidence that adults can overcome 
adversity from initial disadvantage (Cunha and Heckman, 2009), and counteract the 
inequality in family environments. Belley and Lochner (2007) demonstrate that the primary 
factor explaining differentials in college attendance in the U.S. is cognitive ability (not family 
income), and Cunha and Heckman (2009) show that cognitive deficits can be remedied 
substantially, even if not fully reversed. We turn next to the process of facing up to 
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educational variance, the concern that this variance raises, the possibility of taking action to 
remedy it, and the manner in which public policy can support such action. 
We consider a setting in which individuals derive utility from their earnings, and 
disutility from the relative deprivation which arises from a comparison of their earnings with 
the earnings of others in their comparison or reference group. There are two types of 
individuals: l, and h.
1
 Imagine a dichotomous setting in which the l-individuals can choose 
either to acquire advanced human capital which, while enhancing their earnings, will place 
them in the reference group of the h-individuals, all of whom have acquired advanced human 
capital and have higher earnings, or not to acquire advanced human capital, in which case 
they remain in the group of the l-individuals who did not elect to invest in the acquisition of 
advanced human capital. In the former case the l-individuals experience relative deprivation 
when the earnings gap cannot be compressed; in the latter case they do not. Let us now 
imagine that the earnings of the h-individuals are taxed. The relative deprivation to which the 
l-individuals will be exposed will be lower should they acquire advanced human capital and 
have their reference group consist of those similarly equipped. At the margin, the combination 
of high(er) earnings and (a now muted) relative deprivation will be more attractive to the l-
individuals than the preceding combination, and consequently they will be more likely to 
acquire human capital. This prediction is at variance with much of the received literature, 
which intimates that higher tax rates on earnings conferred by human capital either deter the 
acquisition of human capital and result in fewer individuals doing so or, at a minimum, hardly 
promote human capital formation.
2
 
In the remainder of this paper we proceed as follows. We divide our analysis into two 
sections. In section I we study the altered human capital formation calculus of l-individuals 
when h-individuals are taxed. We show that when a tax is introduced, l-individuals become 
more willing to acquire human capital, and that this shift in inclination is not achieved by, for 
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example, subsidizing these individuals. To address the possible concern that the educational 
gains of the l-individuals could come at the expense of poorer education for the h-individuals, 
we study in section II the behavior of the h-individuals. After all, taxing the incomes of the h-
individuals could prompt them to reduce their optimal level of human capital acquisition. 
Therefore, in the first part of section II we propose a scheme in which the tax regime does not 
interfere with the human capital formation calculus of the h-individuals. In the second part of 
section II we describe a setting in which, when we admit heterogeneity of the group of the h-
individuals, the complete set of reactions to the imposition of the tax (with no subsidies at all) 
could result in the average level of human capital of the group of the h-individuals remaining 
unchanged. 
 
I. THE l-INDIVIDUALS 
Let the l-individuals be high-school graduates who consider undertaking advanced study, say 
university education, and let the h-individuals be high-school graduates who undertake such 
advanced study. In this section we study the behavior of the l-individuals who, we assume, are 
identical to each other in all relevant respects. 
 
The basic model 
Let the utility, u, of an l-individual be given by the difference between his income, Y, which 
depends on his human capital (level of education), e, and the cost of acquiring that human 
capital, C.
3
 In what follows, superscripts denote the type of the individual, and subscripts 
denote derivatives. Thus, 








lim;0C  ,0  ; 0  ,0 . 
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The first order condition for a maximum of (1) is 
(3)  0=− le
l
e CY .  
Let *1e  be the interior solution of (3) that is, 
*
1e  is the optimal level of human capital of an l-
individual. 
What happens when relative deprivation, RD, plays a role? What happens when 
individuals derive (dis)utility not only from incurring a cost of acquiring human capital, but 
also from an unfavorable comparison of their earnings with the earnings of others? If the l-
individuals refrain from further study and remain in the reference group of the high-school 
graduates, they will not be exposed to relative deprivation, yet their earnings will be low. If 
they study further, they will enjoy higher earnings but since they will increasingly belong to 
the group of those who acquired advanced human capital, they will experience relative 
deprivation upon comparing themselves with counterparts who originate from a “high” 
education family environment and whose earnings are higher than theirs. In making their 
choice, the l-individuals thus compare low earnings combined with low relative deprivation 
with high earnings combined with high relative deprivation. We assume that the l-individuals 
can choose from a continuum of levels of human capital, and that their social proximity to the 
h-individuals correspondingly depends on the extent of their study.
4
 The utility function of an 
l-individual is then 
(4)  )()()()( eRDeCeYeuu ll −−== . 
Let the relative deprivation that an l-individual senses within a reference group be defined as  
(5)  RYforFFYRF ll <<>− 0'',0'with )( , 
where R is the average income of l’s reference group, and 0)( =− lYRF  for RY l ≥ . Two 
comments are in order. First, (5) states that relative deprivation is sensed if and when income 
falls below the average income of the reference group, and it depends positively on this 
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shortfall. The concavity of F means that a given small decrease in own income increases 
relative deprivation by less when one’s income is further removed from the average income 
(or that a given small decrease in his own income results in a greater increase in relative 
deprivation when the average income is closer). When an individual’s income is further away 
from the group’s average income, the level of relative deprivation that he senses is less 
sensitive to small changes in his own income. Second, both theory and evidence reveal that 
people’s behavior is conditioned by their dismay from others having more than they have, not 
by a glee from others having less. For example, the relative income hypothesis formulated and 
tested by Duesenberry (1949), posits an asymmetry in the comparisons of income which 
affect the individual’s behavior: the individual looks upward when making comparisons. In a 
similar vein, the comparisons that affect the allocation of the individual’s time between work 
and leisure are those with individuals whose incomes are higher than his own (see, for 
example, Stutzer 2004, and Bowles and Park 2005). 
The relative deprivation of an l-individual, RD(e), “rests” upon two reference groups: 
the l-individuals, and the h-individuals. We assume that relative deprivation is a weighted 
sum, and that the weight that an l-individual attaches to the relative deprivation that arises 
from a comparison with the h-individuals, 1)(0 ≤≤ eβ , depends positively on l’s level of 
human capital, that is, 0>eβ : the more advanced, university type, human capital an l-
individual acquires, the closer he is in social space to, and the more he compares himself with 
university graduates and, correspondingly, the less he compares himself with the group of 
high school graduates who did not choose to invest in advanced, university level human 
capital. While with a higher level of human capital the income of an l-individual becomes 
closer to the average income of the h-individuals, we assume that no matter how much human 
capital an l-individual acquires, the average income of the h-individuals, hY , will always 
remain higher than his, that is, lh YY > . The weight attached to the relative deprivation that is 
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sensed in the comparison with other l-individuals is ( )(1 eβ− ). However, since the group of 
the l-individuals is homogenous and all the l-individuals make the same human capital 
formation decisions in an identical manner, there arises no income disparity within their midst 
and hence, no relative deprivation is sensed upon comparisons within the l-group. From the 
preceding considerations, RD(e) can thus be expressed as 
(6)  )]([)()( eYYFeeRD lh −= β . 
Inserting (6) into (4) we get 
(7)  )]([)()()()( eYYFeeCeYeuu lhll −−−== β . 
For this utility function, the first order condition for a maximum is 






e YeYYFeeYYFCY ββ . 





ee RDCY  holds, hence that 
*
2e  constitutes a unique solution to (8). 
From a comparison of (3) with (8), we derive a proposition that provides a condition 
under which the incorporation of relative deprivation dampens the optimal level of the human 
capital that is acquired by the l-individuals. 
Proposition 1. *2e <
*
1e  if 












e ββ . 
Proof. Suppose otherwise, that is, that *1
*















e −≤− . 





























































e ββ , 
which contradicts (8). Q.E.D. 













e −>− ββ . 
The left hand side of (13) is the marginal change in individual l’s RD that arises from him 
getting closer in social space to the h-individuals. Since the income of the h-individuals is 
always higher than his, this effect is positive and therefore, it is a “bad”; it increases RD. The 
right hand side of (13) represents the marginal change in RD that arises from the comparison 
with the h-individuals when income increases and therefore, it reduces RD. Thus, condition 
(9) will hold and Proposition 1 will be satisfied if the former effect outweighs the latter effect 
namely, if the change in l’s reference groups (getting closer in social space to the rich h-
individuals) due to an increase in human capital raises the l-individual’s RD more than the 




Augmenting the basic model by introducing an income tax 
Suppose now that a progressive tax, 0>t , is in place such that while high incomes are taxed, 
low incomes are not. In our case only the incomes of the h-individuals are taxed. To ensure 
that the tax is never high enough to reverse the income positions of the h-individuals and the 
l-individuals, we further assume that *tt < , where 1)/(1* <−= hl YYt . An l-individual will 
now “face” the following utility function 
(14) )]()1[()()()()( eYYtFeeCeYeuu lhll −−−−== β . 
When the tax is in place, an l-individual’s decision making will be affected since his 
relative deprivation is affected at the margin. The first-order condition for a maximum of (14) 
is 
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e YeYYtFeeYYtFCY ββ . 
Let the solution of (15) be denoted by *3e . 
We now derive a proposition to the effect that the imposition of a tax on the h-
individuals raises the optimal level of the acquired human capital of the l-individuals. 
Proposition 2. *3e >
*
2e . 










































where Ω , the derivative of the left hand side of (15) with respect to e is simply the second 
order condition, and hence it must be negative at the optimum. From the properties of RD in 
(5) we know that 0)]()(1[' >−− eYYtF lh  and 0)]()(1['' <−− eYYtF lh . Thus, it follows 
from (16) that 0>
dt
de
, and hence that *2
*
3 ee > . Q.E.D.  
Our analysis suggests a novel way of inducing individuals of type l to become more 
willing to acquire human capital. This shift in inclination is achieved not by subsidizing these 
individuals but by taxing the incomes of the h-individuals.
6
 
It is worth noting that many public finance scholars have studied optimal income 
taxation without endogenizing human capital formation (see, for example, Mirrlees 1971, and 
Diamond 1998), and a few have attended to human capital formation in a dynamic framework 
(Kapicka 2006). However, in the received literature on human capital formation and taxation, 
the impact of taxes on the endogenous selection of reference groups has not been considered, 
nor have the repercussions of this link been studied for the selection of the optimal level of 
human capital. 
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When h-individuals are taxed, there might be a crowding-out effect; these individuals 
could well reduce their level of human capital formation. Hence, in the first part of the 
following section II, we analyze a scheme in which a tax regime does not interfere with the 
human capital formation calculus of the h-individuals. It is important to note that applying a 
comparable scheme to the l-individuals would, however, lead them to acquire a lower level of 
human capital. In the second part of section II we describe a setting in which, if we admit 
heterogeneity within the group of h-individuals, the complete set of reactions to the 
imposition of the tax (with no subsidies at all) could result in the average level of human 
capital of the h-individuals remaining unchanged. 
 
II. THE h-INDIVIDUALS 
 
The h-individuals constitute a homogenous group 
If marginal benefits and marginal costs are reduced by the same proportion, there will be no 
effect on the optimal level of human capital chosen by an h-individual, and we are “out of the 
woods” (cf. Boskin 1975). 
We show that if there is a subsidy such that for taxpayers part of their human capital 
formation costs are tax deductible, there will be no revision in the human capital formation of 
the h-individuals when the taxes are introduced. 
Since the h-individuals earn more than the l-individuals, they are not exposed to relative 
deprivation. Their utility function is 
(17) )()()( eCeYeuu hh −== . 
Maximization of (17) yields 
(18) 0=− he
h
e CY .  
Let the solution to (18) be denoted by *4e . 
 13
When an income tax is in place, (17) needs be rewritten. This yields 
(19) )()()1()( eCeYteuu hh −−== . 
The first order condition for a maximum of this utility function is 
(20) 0)1( =−− he
h
e CYt . 




5 ee < . 
However, if the net cost of forming human capital is reduced at the margin by, for 
example, making the cost of human capital formation tax deductible, then an h-individual will 
again maximize his utility by choosing human capital level *4e . To see this, suppose that we 
implement a subsidy, s, such that 
(21) )()( etCess h== . 
Modifying the utility function in (19) to incorporate the provision of the subsidy yields 
(22) )]()()[1()]()([)()1()( eCeYteseCeYteuu hhhh −−=−−−== . 
In the presence of a tax and in the absence of a subsidy, an h-individual will find it 
optimal to increase his level of human capital up to *5e , since up to 
*
5e  the marginal benefit 
exceeds the marginal cost. However, if a subsidy as in (21) is in place, the marginal condition 
of optimality for the h-individual’s problem of maximizing (22) will not differ from (18) and 





hh > , 
the tax revenue will always be greater than the subsidies disbursed. Thus, this tax-subsidy 
scheme will not impose upon the government any fiscal burden. We summarize these results 
in the following proposition. 
Proposition 3. The level of human capital formed by the h-individuals will not be affected by 
the imposition of the tax-cum-subsidy scheme when the cost of forming human capital is 
effectively made deductible from the tax. Furthermore, the net revenue from such a tax-cum-
subsidy scheme is positive.  
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Alternatively, it could have been argued that an effective way of inducing the l-
individuals to acquire more human capital would have been to subsidize their formation of 
human capital; however, such support would have entailed extra expense for the government. 
In addition, if a tax is levied on the h-individuals in order to finance the disbursement of the 
subsidies, the government will need to be aware of the repercussion of levying this tax on the 
l-individuals, who in response, as already noted, will be induced to acquire even more human 
capital upon a lowered relative deprivation. This response may lead to an excessive subsidy 
bill to the government. Furthermore, it can be shown that applying to the l-individuals a 
scheme that is analogous to the aforementioned scheme of taxing and subsidizing the h-
individuals would actually lead to a lower level of human capital formed by the l-individuals. 
Intuitively, the preceding tax-cum-subsidy scheme is designed to affect to an equal extent the 
marginal benefit of human capital formation (through tax) and its marginal cost (through 
subsidy). However, a tax on the l-individuals will also reduce the marginal utility of these 
individuals by increasing their relative deprivation from the comparison of their diminished 
earnings (because of the tax) with the earnings of the h-individuals. This additional bite into 
the marginal utility (because of the effect of the tax on relative deprivation) then implies that 
such a self-financing combination of a tax and subsidy applied to the l-individuals will 
dampen their human capital formation. 
 
The h-individuals constitute a heterogeneous group 
Suppose that there is heterogeneity in the income of the h-individuals. Let there be two sub-
groups of h-individuals that differ in their abilities: there are ordinary h-individuals, 
henceforth oh-individuals, and there are excellent or exceptional h-individuals, henceforth eh-
individuals. We assume that the oh-individuals have the same structure of a utility function as 
the l-individuals. Since, by assumption, oheh YY > , eh-individuals are not relatively deprived. 
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However the average income of the entire university group, hY , is composed of the incomes 
of the eh-individuals and the incomes of the oh-individuals. Therefore, ohh YY > . 
Consequently, oh-individuals derive (suffer) (dis)utility, that is, they experience relative 
deprivation from comparing their income with the average income of their reference group, 
the university graduates. Thus, the utility function of an oh-individual can be written as
7
 
(23) )]([)()()( eYYFeCeYeuu ohhohoh −−−== . 
In this environment, eh-individuals will continue to make human capital formation 
decisions as per (18), while oh-individuals will be guided in their human capital formation 
decisions by maximizing (23). The maximization of (23) yields the first-order condition 




e YeYYFCY . 
When an income tax is imposed on both sub-groups of h-individuals, eh-individuals will 
(continue to) make human capital formation decisions based on (20), resulting in a lower 
human capital level than that which is formed in the absence of the tax. On the other hand, the 
post-tax utility function of an oh-individual is modified to 
(25) ))]()(1[()()()1()( eYYtFeCeYteuu ohhohoh −−−−−== , 
which leads to the revised first-order condition 




e YeYYtFtCYt . 
Comparing (26) with (24) reveals that the introduction of a tax on all h-individuals leads 
to three effects regarding the optimal level of human capital formed by oh-individuals. First, 
as in the case for the eh-individuals, the tax bites into the marginal benefit of oh-individuals 
(see the first term on the LHS of (26)) and therefore reduces their human capital formation. 
Second, the tax also reduces the extent to which an oh-individual’s extra human capital 
formation is capable of closing the gap with the group’s average income (that is, (1 − t) entails 
a lower third term on the LHS of (26)), resulting in yet another negative effect on human 
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capital formation. Third, the tax shrinks the income gap between an oh-individual and the 
average income of his reference group and hence makes human capital accumulation more 
effective in reducing the RD sensed by an oh-individual (that is, ))]()(1[(' eYYtF ohh −−  in the 
third term on the LHS of (26) is larger), thereby entailing a positive effect on human capital 
formation by an oh-individual. If and when the third effect outweighs the first two effects, an 
oh-individual will end up forming a higher level of human capital in the wake of the 
imposition of taxes. 
There is still one more reason why the oh-individuals may want to increase their level of 
human capital after income taxes are imposed on all h-individuals. If due to the introduction 
of the tax, l-individuals (partly) join (from below) the group of university graduates, the 
average income of the group of university graduates decreases. This lowers the relative 
deprivation sensed by the oh-individuals. Consequently, their incentive to acquire human 
capital will be strengthened. 
The overall effect of the tax on the average human capital of the h-individuals is 
ambiguous. If the conventional scaling-back effect for both the eh-individuals and the oh-
individuals dominates the amplification effect coming from the oh-individuals, then the 
impact of the imposition of a tax on the level of human capital of all h-individuals will be 
negative. But if the amplification effect is sufficiently strong, the optimal level of human 
capital chosen by the oh-individuals will exceed the optimal level chosen by them prior to the 
introduction of the tax and, consequently, there may be no revision in the average level of 
human capital of the group of the h-individuals due to the imposition of taxes on them. 
 
III. CONCLUSIONS 
We studied a setting in which economic mobility is intertwined with social mobility: a shift in 
earnings is associated with a shift in social space. If an l-individual with a lower income 
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moves in social space closer to h, high income, individuals, he will experience negative 
utility. If the acquisition of advanced human capital by l type individuals cannot be 
disentangled from such a move, the attractiveness of acquiring advanced human capital will 
be dimmed; not very much human capital will be formed. To the extent that more (advanced) 
human capital increases social welfare, policies aimed at countering this diluting effect (an 
effect that emanates from the sensing of relative deprivation by the l-individuals) are called 
for. We suggested a novel way of encouraging individuals who are relatively less educated to 
acquire advanced human capital. This is achieved not by subsidizing these individuals, but by 
taxing the incomes of the high-income individuals. The tax serves to diminish the pain felt by 
the l-individuals when they compare their incomes with those of the h-individuals. This 
reduction in loss of utility leads them to acquire more human capital. From the standpoint of a 
government’s budget, the advantage of a taxation scheme, compared with a subsidization 
scheme, to promote human capital formation is obvious.  
When the h-individuals are taxed, there might be a crowding-out effect: some of them 
could reduce their human capital formation. We presented a scheme in which a tax regime 
does not interfere with the human capital formation calculus of the h-individuals. We have 
shown that the overall effect on the human capital formation of the taxed individuals is to 
leave their human capital intact. Alternatively, if the h-individuals constitute a heterogeneous 
group, there may well be no change in their average human capital formation when the tax is 
introduced. A subsidy system will not then be required. 
We have assumed that advanced education is associated with a revision of reference 
group affiliation; such a revision is endogenous to any process of acquiring additional 
education and is intertwined with moving across educational groups. When university 
education is undertaken, the weight assigned to the reference group of high-school graduates 
is reduced, whereas the weight assigned to university-educated individuals is increased. If 
 18
high-school learning is undertaken in one’s home town, whereas university education is 
pursued in a city away from home, the spatial relocation entails a co-movement in social 
space. 
In this paper we measured relative deprivation in terms of income, and did not endow 
individuals with utility-conferring social assets such as, for example, the inherent prestige, or 
loss of prestige, from belonging to a particular group. In a different setup it could be argued 
that people undertake additional education in order to garner the prestige associated with 
belonging to the highly-educated group. (This is done in Fan and Stark, forthcoming). Our 
perspective is exactly the opposite: affiliation of an l-individual with the highly-educated 
group exposes the l-individual to a loss of “prestige:” it confers disutility, as when the 
earnings of the l-individual fall short of the earnings of the h-individual. In our framework, 
there is no room for “prestige” from trailing behind others. However, our results would stand 
even if, in a more general model, prestige were to be added, provided that “the prestige effect” 
is weaker than the relative deprivation effect. 
 
APPENDIX 
In this appendix we assume that there are n skill types. We show that an income-specific tax 
scheme can increase the amount of human capital formed by individuals at the bottom of the 
skill hierarchy, while preserving the human-capital-formation decisions of the high-skill 
types. Such a tax policy will result in both larger aggregate human capital and lower income 
inequality in the economy. 
Let the individuals be classified into n skill types, indexed by i, with i = 1 being the 
most skilled type, and i n=  being the least skilled type. Because we assume that individuals’ 
incomes correlate positively with their skill levels, all the individuals except for the most 
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skilled suffer from relative deprivation. Thus, the utility function of a type-i individual, for 
ni ≤≤2 , is given by  
(A1) )]([)()()()( eYYFeeCeYeuu iiiiii −−−== +β  
where iY+  denotes the average income of individuals whose skill levels are higher than i’s, 
and hence i’s optimal human capital, ei, is determined by the following first-order condition: 
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We derive the desired income-specific tax scheme recursively. First, in line with 
Proposition 3, let t1 be the tax rate levied on the income of type-1 (the most skilled) 
individuals such that when coupled with a self-financed education subsidy, it leaves their 
human capital formation unchanged. As our preceding analysis suggests, in the presence of 
this tax rate, type-2 individuals will have an incentive to acquire more human capital because 
the associated move in “social space” towards the type-1 individuals becomes less 
intimidating. A simultaneous countervailing tax rate of t2 can be levied on the incomes of 
type-2 individuals, such that they will elect to acquire the same amount of human capital, e2, 
































2 )1( YtY −=+  is the (average) net income of type-1 individuals, and e2 satisfies (A2) 
with i = 2. From 122 YYY =< ++  and the concavity of the )(⋅F  function it is easy to see that the 
left hand side of (A3) is strictly decreasing in t2, and that it is positive when t2 = 0 and 
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Thus, there exists a unique t2, where 
*
220 tt << , that solves (A3), implying that the imposition 
of tax rates t1 on type-1 individuals and t2 on type-2 individuals will leave the human capital 
acquisition of type-2 individuals unchanged as well.  
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Similarly, the countervailing tax rate, t3, on type-3 individuals that leaves their human 































where 3+Y  is the average net income of type-1 individuals and type-2 individuals, which is 
less than 3+Y . Let 12t  denote the average tax rate on 
3
+Y  such that 
33
12 )1( ++ =− YYt . Then, upon 
denoting 3312
*
3 /YYtt +≡ , it can be similarly shown that there exists a unique t3, where 
*
330 tt << , that solves (A4), and hence, the imposition thus far of the tax scheme t1, t2, and t3 
will leave intact the human capital acquisitions by the individuals of type-1, type-2, and type-
3. 
In general, tracking the same procedure, we can come up an income-specific tax scheme 
(t1, t2, ..., tn-1) levied on type-1, type-2, ..., and type-(n-1) individuals respectively, such that 
enacting the scheme will not alter the human capital acquisition decisions of all the 
individuals except those of type-n (the least skilled ones). After the imposition of the above 
tax scheme, the optimal human capital formed by the type-n individuals is obtained from  
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where nY+  is the average net income of type-1 to type-(n-1) individuals. Since 
nn
YY ++ < , it 
follows from comparing (A5) and (A2) that the solution of (A5) is larger than that of (A2), 
that is, the type-n individuals will acquire a larger amount of human capital in the presence of 
the tax scheme (t1, t2, ..., tn-1) than in its absence.  






We are indebted to three editors and to two referees for comments and suggestions that led to 
several revisions and improvements of the paper. 
 
NOTES 
1. A two-category classification of individuals is obviously a simplification of individuals’ heterogeneity 
in reality. However, in the appendix we show that the principles of, and the insights yielded by the 
analysis regarding the interactions between two adjacent skill levels or groups, as well as how tax 
policies might affect such interactions, also apply in a more realistic setting with an n-category 
classification of individuals. 
2. For example, Eaton and Rosen (1980) show that an increase in the tax levied on earnings from interest 
increases human capital accumulation when the returns to the human capital investment are certain 
while the taxation of wages has no effect on the investment in human capital. Eaton and Rosen (1980) 
further demonstrate that when the returns to the investment in human capital are uncertain, taxation of 
wages or of earnings from interest either increases or decreases the investment in human capital. 
3. This assumption of a utility function that is linear in the net income of an individual is made primarily 
for expositional convenience. It is rather straightforward to verify that our analysis will go through if, 
instead, we were to assume that the utility function is increasing and concave in an individual’s net 
income. 
4. Subject to some additional assumptions, our results hold also in the discrete case in which an l-
individual compares himself either to other l-individuals if not acquiring advanced human capital, or to 
h-individuals upon acquiring advanced human capital. 
5. Put differently, Proposition 1 holds if RDe>0. 
6. In an intertemporal setting, increasing the tax on individuals with high levels of human capital may 
potentially have the opposite effect to that posited in Proposition 2: the incentive for individuals with 
low skill levels to acquire more human capital could be weakened since their investment-enhanced 
future earnings might be subjected to higher taxation. However, whether the investment-enhancing 
effect studied in the current model is strong enough to elevate the income of the low-skill individuals to 
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a higher tax bracket and, if it is, whether the effect would be powerful enough to negate the investment-
enhancing effect are empirical issues. 
7. An oh-individual attaches a weight of one to the RD that arises from comparing himself with the h-
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